Over many years, securitization has proven to be an expedient and highly flexible refinancing tool for corporates and public sector entities that seek a more accurate capital-market based valuation of asset performance. After successful securitization by public sector entities in advanced countries, also sovereigns in emerging economies are becoming adept at securitization as an efficient means of asset-liability management. The following article critically surveys the recent developments of sovereign securitization in emerging markets and informs a more specific debate about the attendant infrastructural, legal and regulatory challenges. Amid lower risk premia in a changing interest rate cycle, the current trend of greater investor differentiation in emerging markets creates a benign environment for sovereign securitization to accommodate continued institutional investor demand for highly rated debt.
Introduction
On the heels of several prominent defaults and downgrades of U.S. corporations over the recent past, the subsequent haircut unwinding of exposed derivatives positions reverberated in mounting concern about current risk measurement standards in structured finance and their knock-on effects on other asset classes. However, subsequent warnings about financial stability were frequently substantiated by indistinct assessments of the attendant benefits and drawbacks of risk transfer in different forms of structured finance, such as asset securitization. Over many years, securitization has proven to be an expedient and highly flexible refinancing tool for corporates and public sector entities that seek a more accurate capital-market based valuation of asset performance. After successful securitization by public sector entities in advanced countries, also sovereigns in emerging economies are gaining experience in understanding the concept of securitization as an efficient means of asset-liability management. The following article critically surveys the recent developments of sovereign securitization in emerging markets and informs a more specific debate about the attendant infrastructural, legal and regulatory challenges. Amid lower risk premia in a changing interest rate cycle, the current trend of greater investor differentiation in emerging markets creates a benign environment for sovereign securitization to accommodate continued demand for highly rated debt by institutional investors.
Discussion

Market-value based asset-liability management of governments and structured finance
It is commonplace to argue that greater fiscal discipline to remedy a persistent structural budget deficit at a time of low economic growth (i.e. cyclical fiscal policy) is likely to exacerbate economic conditions. Conventional methods, such as reduced government spending and/or higher taxation, tend to discourage private investment and hinder the country's competitiveness. Moreover, greater global competition on price and innovation lowers the ability of businesses to pay taxes unless more efficient asset-liability management (ALM) of the public sector translates into a lower tax burden to service public debt. Against the background of these empirical ramifications of the traditional working principle of cyclical fiscal policy, it is incumbent on sovereigns to entertain a debt reduction strategy that motivates a more efficient administration of public assets through the elimination of wasteful activities, so that infrastructural improvements and essential government transfer payments can be funded without additional public debt. However, the inherently opaque management of public assets causes governments to focus on liability management (transfer payments and government spending) and taxation as measures of greater fiscal discipline.
While public sector liabilities are managed in a transparent and market-driven fashion, the traditional approach to public assets as permanent properties (regardless of possible alternatives) supports historical cost accounting, which obscures the true market value of public assets. This method negates the opportunity cost of the use of public assets and encourages inefficient management, which entails weak government control over the type and volume of public assets. Moreover, low turnover of users and rare sales of public assets perpetuate systemic disincentives to change. A "market value" approach to public assets, however, would facilitate a more efficient management of public goods and services, whose traditional funding by tax revenues (and credit) would now be subject to an economic cost-benefit analysis as means to identify both excess capacity and new investment to meet public demands. So far, most government sources of funds are not referenced to a specific public assets, which impedes a transparent price discovery and fair valuation of public service obligations for efficient resource allocation. In 1997, the British government set the precedent for a "market value" approach by introducing the National Asset Register, which requires all government departments to annually audit their used assets on the basis of their opportunity cost. Following the U.K. example, in 2003, the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) initiated the "balance sheet at market values" (BS-MV) i approach as a key decision making instrument for ALM.
The implementation of a market-value based ALM strategy requires a portfolio of complementary financial instruments for both investment and divestment, which range from real estate investment funds for public asset disposal and concessions or direct outsourcing of management activities, on one hand, to low-cost project finance for public infrastructure and structured finance, on the other hand.
As opposed to conventional bank lending and other forms of intermediated finance, these sources of funds monetize existing or expected receivables from public assets to fund future investments without greater asset exposure or balance sheet growth.
So far the involvement of public sector entities in structured finance ii has been mostly limited to saleleaseback transactions by tax-exempt subnational authorities as a mechanism to privatize large strategic, state-owned enterprises. However, an increasing number of governments and public agencies have also set their sights on asset securitization as an alternative, market-based source of funds. Asset securitization is a highly flexible yet complex structured finance technique that involves the issuance of contingent claims as liability and equity obligations on the back of identifiable cash flows from a diversified pool of asset exposures.
Definition of asset securitization
Asset securitization describes the process and the result of converting a pool of designated financial assets into tradable liability and equity obligations as contingent claims backed by identifiable cash flows from the credit and payment performance of these asset exposures (Jobst, 2006a) .
iii From an issuer perspective, securitization registers as an alternative, market-based source of refinancing profitable economic activity in lieu of intermediated debt finance. Securitization seeks to substitute capital market-based finance for credit finance by sponsoring financial relationships without the lending and deposit-taking capabilities of banks (disintermediation). Issuers raise funds via securitization in order to improve their capital management and liquidity position without increasing the capital base. The implicit risk transfer of securitization allows issuers to benefit from more cost efficient terms of high-credit quality finance without increasing their on-balance sheet liabilities or compromising the profit-generating capacity of assets. Investors in securitization have a wider choice of high-quality investments at their disposal, whose market valuation engenders greater overall efficiency and liquidity of capital markets. However, securitization involves a complex structured finance technology, which commands significant initial investment of managerial and financial resources.
Aside from being a flexible and efficient source of funding, the off-balance sheet treatment of securitization also serves (i) to reduce both economic cost of capital and regulatory minimum capital requirements as a balance sheet restructuring tool (regulatory and economic motive) and (ii) to diversify asset exposures (especially interest rate risk and currency risk). The generation of securitized cash flows from a diversified asset portfolio represents an effective method of redistributing asset risks to investors and broader capital markets (transformation and fragmentation of asset exposures). iv The tradability of asset risk also facilitates the synthetic assembly and dynamic adjustment of asset portfolios via secondary markets. As opposed to ordinary debt, a securitized contingent claim on a promised portfolio performance affords investors at low transaction costs to quickly adjust their investment holdings due to changes in personal risk sensitivity, market sentiment and/or consumption preferences.
Public sector securitization in developed countries
Sovereign-sponsored asset securitization facilitates the divestment of the government function of funding infrastructure investment and helps governments discharge their public service obligation of efficiently managing public assets. Securitization serves as vehicle of privatization, which aims to transfer public assets and service delivery to the private sector. Its use also implies a conscious choice of how much management and/or ownership control over securitized assets should be retained, and whether the potential benefits from the degree of envisaged privatization or asset management reform justify adverse socio-economic implications. Privatization ranges from a complete shift of the production of a good or the provision of a service from the government to the private sector through either the disposal of government-owned assets or the contracting out management capabilities, on one hand, to the establishment of public-private partnerships, on the other hand. Even the creation of federal corporations, quasi-government organizations and government-sponsored enterprises is often filed under the general category of privatization. Within the broader context of a market-oriented ALM strategy, securitization represents the financing platform of any action that involves exposing the operations of the government to the pressures of the commercial marketplace.
Governments have traditionally performed an indirect function in asset securitization as a provider of implicit or explicit state guarantees and other forms of government credit support to asset-backed securities issued by public agencies, such as government-sponsored securitization platforms for residential mortgages (e.g. agency RMBS in the U.S.) and public subsidies for SME loans via development banks (e.g. the SME loan program by Germany's development bank KfW, which also administers a standing securitization platform for synthetic CLOs of SME credits, called PROMISE (Promotional Mittelstand Loan Securitization) (Jobst, 2006a; Glüder and Böhm, 2003 (with €7.9bn (U.S.$10.4bn) still outstanding).
Private and public sector securitization in emerging economies
After having evolved rapidly as a risk transfer and refinancing tool in developed economies, asset securitization has also assumed a vital role for private sector financing in EM countries. Since the end of the 1980s, viii large and highly-rated corporates and banks in developing economies have successfully sold receivables from future claims against obligors. Such "future flow securitization"
involves the origination of foreign currency-denominated debt secured by future export receivables (e.g. oil and steel) ix and financial flows from either credit card merchant vouchers or other payment rights in a move to vault the low sovereign ceiling of EM county ratings and borrow at lesser cost than under conventional funding methods.
x In light of the importance of financial liberalization in improving the efficiency of capital markets, several EM countries have developed the legal and financial infrastructure necessary to strengthen their local securitization markets (Meddin, 2005) . This has allowed the securitization of existing assets in local currencies in domestic capital markets or even abroad via cross-border ABS transactions (CBEAs) xi (despite the currency mismatch between securities denominated in foreign currency and underlying assets generated in local currency).
Also the public sector in many EM countries has embraced securitization as an expedient means to foster favorable external debt dynamics (i.e. lower debt service relative to current account receipts), greater fiscal consolidation (i.e. lower public debt relative to GDP), and a more balanced amortization profile of public debt. With the development of a strong local institutional investor base amid regulatory, tax, and legal reforms, asset securitization has become an attractive funding solution for the public asset-liability management. xii The securitization by subnational authorities is particularly prominent. Over the recent past, federal, state and local authorities (municipalities and provinces) as well as government agencies in various emerging market countries have securitized future revenues to domestic and/or retail investors. In most cases, public sector agencies have enlisted securitization in order to monetize tax receivables (federal tax participations), deferred sales tax revenue, oil and gas royalties, future water receivables, toll road revenues, sovereign lease receivables, government loans, housing loan receivables, and performing bank assets from state deposit insurance schemes.
The international securitization and collateralized lending by Argentinean and Mexican states, provinces and municipalities on federally collected coparticipation tax revenue receivables has become a hallmark of sovereign securitization in Latin American. In Argentina, the Coparticipation Law of 1988 stipulates the exclusive collection of certain taxes (income, value-added, exercise and consumption taxes) by the federal government on behalf of the providences. Several Argentinean providences disposed their borrowing authority by leveraging their on their revenues from the federal tax coparticipation (copa) system. In light of the overall reduction of copa flows and the peso devaluation during the Argentinean crisis, however, Many emerging market countries are very adept at indirect sovereign-sponsored securitization with the long-term aim of developing security markets as an efficient mechanism of refinancing asset origination in areas of public interest. In particular, many governments in EMs have focused on the development of mortgage securitization to ensure a stable supply of housing funds. However, compared to agency-backed mortgage securitization in advanced economies, secondary mortgage markets in emerging markets are still small relative to the total stock of outstanding stock of residential mortgages (see Table 1 ). 
Benefits of securitization for sovereigns
Generally, sovereign issuers may find securitization attractive because of an improved access to funds during liquidity crises, while investors have a wider choice of high-quality investments as overall efficiency of capital markets improves. Besides the frequently hackneyed objective of reducing budget deficits, sovereign originators benefit particularly from: (i) the market-based valuation of public assets and creation of sovereign equity if assets are undervalued; (ii) better asset-liability management and debt sustainability, as the issuance of asset-backed debt allows issues to fund new assets, whose cash flows are perfectly matched to the repayment of investors until redemption, avoiding potential maturity mismatch of the sovereign balance sheet; (iii) active management of designated asset portfolio and greater control over asset status; and (iv) the isolation of certain assets in order to make them self-financing at a fair market rate and attract international investment grade finance. xxiv Finally, perhaps one of the most overlooked incentives for governments to promote the securitization of public assets vis-à-vis ordinary unsecured debt finance also lies in the externalities (IMF, 2003) associated with it. Future flow securitization tend involve a much closer scrutiny of the legal and institutional environment than unsecured transactions. Hence, these deals can produce enormous benefits by making valuable information available to investors. Especially for emerging market issuers, the securitization of future flow receivables may be the only way to begin accessing international capital market at reasonable capital cost. 
Window of opportunity for sovereign securitization in emerging markets
For emerging markets, the enhanced credit rating from securitization has gained particular importance as investor differentiation across developing countries increases. The recent decline of cross-country correlations suggests that liabilities of "creditor countries," i.e. those with current account surpluses and/or no need of near-term external financing are expected to outperform "debtor countries" with significant external financing requirements, which are more subject to changes in risk aversion and higher levels of attendant asset volatility. In this context, asset securitization, possibly backed by guarantees from international development banks, would allow governments in heavily-indebted countries to achieve lower external financing cost than would be possible on the strength of their own balance sheets alone amid greater risk aversion of emerging market investors.
With the recent correction of emerging market debt indicating a potential decline of credit quality and higher idiosyncratic risk on the horizon, highly rated sovereign securitization could also provide much needed liquidity as investors move back into traditional instruments (e.g. sovereign debt and high grade corporate debt). Previously, improved credit quality in emerging markets led to a greater systemic pricing component of emerging market debt. Once the idiosyncratic nature of emerging market debt had begun to subside (and cross-correlations with developed countries increased), external bonds and local currency debt were increasingly traded in a similar fashion to mature market products -with an ever expanding set of exotic options and derivatives in use. At the same time, a greater global cash surplus and a limited supply of traded debt lowered investment returns relative to asset values. The attendant lower risk premium from tightening spreads required even lower risk aversion for the same expected returns. Consequently, poor returns on conventional products and default rates below the historical experience encouraged more risk taking for yield, with emerging market titles becoming an attractive asset class despite poor underlying market liquidity in many countries. As emerging market credit shows first signs of deterioration against the background of greater uncertainty about the future interest path associated with a more stringent monetary policy in mature markets, investors might now favor liquidity of mature market investment and/or less risky investment products in emerging markets, such as highly rated and secured government debt.
Challenges for sovereign securitization in emerging market countries
For a viable use of asset securitization certain general criteria need to be satisfied: (i) structural market imperfection due to fiscal constraints and high borrowing costs; (ii) an adequate and bankable legal and regulatory framework for bankruptcy, tax, and corporate governance issues (especially reliable dispute resolution mechanism for investor protection of issuers and investors in case of credit event); and (iii) a transparent transaction structure with financial incentives and covenants to ensure demonstrable and unimpeded control over securitized assets subject to persistent monitoring by rating agencies, trustee and guarantors.
The development of securitization markets also depends on essential economic, infrastructural and regulatory conditions, whose consistent integration ensures systemic integrity. The economic rationale for securitization as a funding and risk transfer mechanism requires the efficient pricing in liquid underlying cash markets of conventional investment products (such as bonds, equity, commodities). The main infrastructural challenges in this area involve (i) the implementation of a modern trading system, which executes clearing and settlement through a single central counterparty (CCP), and (ii) surveillance systems to detect improvident behavior especially in areas that straddle the cash and derivative markets. Finally, the regulation of securitization markets implies the adoption of (i) solid accounting and regulatory standards in specific securitization laws, including the full balance sheet disclosure, the alignment of local accounting rules to international standards, and market supervision through self-regulating organizations (SROs), as well as (ii) a tax environment that creates a level playing field for conventional and structured finance transactions.
Moreover, a sustainable securitization strategy for sovereign entities would require the establishment of a sound market environment, which includes a good credit culture, information transparency, investor sophistication, relative price competitiveness against other sources of external finance, asset class diversity, sufficient domestic savings and institutional investors to manage these savings professionally, an infrastructure of arrangers, clearing agents, exchanges and market makers as well as professional credit rating agencies to establish standards for risk measurement. For instance, the standardization of securitization transactions helps facilitate informed investment and efficient price discovery. Furthermore, the pooling of government assets and the execution of a series of issues based on the same transaction structure reduces significant transaction costs. Although the absence of these conditions hinders private securitization in emerging market and less developed countries, it does so at a lesser degree for sovereign-sponsored securitization. Hence, sovereign securitization could complement financial sector evolution, which commonly starts with state-sponsored creation of bond and equity markets.
However, governments in emerging market countries are faced with several impediments to the efficient execution of structured finance transactions. From a procedural perspective, the scrutiny of securitized collateral is more complicated and less accurate in emerging markets due to the comparative paucity of historical data on defaults in emerging markets, which hinders reliable estimates for recovery rates used in pricing and rating tranched products. Also the lack of sufficiently liquid reference assets, which also are viewed as relatively more highly correlated among themselves, restricts effective underlying pool diversity and broad debt supply. Other constraints have further inhibited sovereign securitization, such as currency risk of foreign-denominated external debt and policy concerns that securitization increases a country's inflexible debt, which, if combined with debt owed to other preferred creditors, could eventually subordinate existing payment obligations. Also high execution costs, structural complexity and the potential principal-agency problems between sovereign issuers and investors as well as administration, collection and fraud risks warrant careful consideration.
Infrastructural, legal and regulatory shortcomings shape up to be the biggest test for securitization as an alternative source of public finance. While asset-backed securities in mature markets are structured under an expansive and highly developed regulatory regime and close supervisory oversight, legal codes in many developing countries are silent on securitization. Overall, the legal and regulatory framework for securitization is still at an early stage of development across emerging market countries. Although the absence of securitization laws could allows issuers to default to less stringent regulations on conventional debt securities, explicit regulatory limitations on securitizable asset classes or the degree to which securitization transactions structures achieve risk transfer, for instance, compromise fundamental precepts of securitization. xxv In many countries, financial transactions and asset transfers also attract sizable stamp or transaction taxes, whose underlying laws have generally preceded the advent of securitization. Hence, without specific exemptions, these taxes create additional transaction costs that might foil the economic viability of securitization. Some emerging market countries (e.g. Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Taiwan, and Ukraine) xxvi have exempted securitization transactions from stamp duties, whereas, in India, stamp duties vary between 0.1 percent and 8 percent depending on the state and asset. xxvii Aside from frequently cumbersome regulatory approval processes, basic trust law for SPVs is under-developed in many countries. This requires securitization vehicles to be established as financial corporations, which may attract many of the provisions of the standard corporate law unsuitable/onerous to securitization.
xxviii Further advancement of securitization is also hampered by poorly developed market practice and standards in many emerging market countries, such as the pervasive lack of uniform transaction structures, common interest rate benchmarks as well as insufficient transparency and disclosure of asset quality due to weak rating agencies or complexities of initial transactions. Additionally, the institutional investor base is generally under-developed. Institutional investors in several countries face certain regulatory rigidities on investment in securitized products. In many countries (e.g.
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Poland) pension fund laws contain strict provisions regarding approved investments and permit investments in structured products upon regulatory approval. xxix In some countries, sovereign securitization itself has also induced the investors' lack of familiarity with complex structured products, after the issuance of mortgage-backed securities by state-sponsored secondary mortgage facilities had encouraged excessive reliance on "with recourse" financing or preference for excessive credit enhancements (Jobst et al., 2006) . Similar problems arise from concerns about poor enforcement, which make capital market participants unwilling to take enforcement risks.
Some of these teething issues, such as administration, collection and fraud risks or potential principalagency problems, are allegedly less relevant for sovereign issuers if transactions are supported by state guarantees. Nonetheless, uncertainties remain as regards the quantification of sovereign counterparty and credit risk due to scarce historical experience on both sovereign defaults and the willingness of governments to declare general moratoria on external payment obligations in their wake. Many other constraints to securitization in emerging markets are likely to be resolved in sequenced and time-bound transition towards more information transparency and asset class diversity as investors and originators become more familiar with structured products. That said, the currency risk of foreign-denominated external debt obligations and policy concerns that securitization increases a country's inflexible debt are more lasting hindrances to the issuance of asset-backed securities abroad and require cooperative efforts with existing private and concessional creditors, such as international banks or multilateral organizations.
Conclusion
The marked-based commoditization of public assets via the transformation process of securitization enhances accountability and encourages a more efficient execution of the public service obligation.
Conventional asset-liability management of governments and quasi-sovereign entities tends to be biased towards debt management, while historical cost accounting in asset management obscures the true market value of public assets. In contrast, asset securitization implies greater control over public assets and facilitates the divestment of the government function in order to make infrastructural investments self-financing at a fair market rate and independent of the sovereign balance sheet.
After successful securitization by public sector entities in advanced countries, also sovereigns in developing and emerging economies are gaining experience in understanding the concept of securitization as a innovative structured finance technique to manage the risks and funding requirements of infrastructure investments. Many federal, state and local authorities in (mostly advanced) emerging market countries have already securitized tax revenues, loan receivables and other cash flows from a variety of existing and future assets. However, sovereign securitization in most emerging market countries is at a still modest level, mainly because of the focus of many governments on conventional debt policy instead of equitable asset-liability management. The nascent development of securitization in general also testifies to several imperfections in economic, infrastructural and regulatory conditions essential to the creation of a sustainable securitization strategy. The frequent absence of special legal frameworks for structured finance, regulatory rigidities, poor market practice and an under-developed local institutional investor base tend to limit the introduction of complex financial products. While some of these constraints on the viable execution of asset securitization in less sophisticated markets are less relevant for sovereign issuers, counterparty, enforcement and convertibility risks in emerging markets are more intricate impediments to efficient securitization by the public sector. While perpetual financial innovation in the private sector looks set to ensure organic growth of securitization in emerging markets, direct public sector involvement helps promote further essential conditions for efficient securitization, such as a bankable legal, tax and regulatory framework, sound standards in origination and trading, and adequate market practice for investor protection and full disclosure.
Sovereign securitization of existing assets in local currencies is deemed particularly plausible for lowrated countries that wish to further develop the width of local debt markets. In cases when local markets remain too small and illiquid to sustain sufficient sovereign debt issuance, governments could also originate foreign currency-denominated debt secured by future export receivables in future flow securitization or securitize infrastructure investments even abroad via cross-border transactions, inflation environment and exchange rate stability permitting. Otherwise, if governments restricted themselves to raising funds from local markets until local institutional investors and price competition amongst different asset classes were well established, they would likely fail to generate a sufficient financing to allow medium-term growth objectives to be met. Efforts to access external markets via structured finance in the form of asset securitization also allows governments to establish liquid pricing benchmarks for sovereign debt in external or local markets, which facilitate trading and help to ensure that at times of economic or financial stress markets can remain active.
Finally, the current trend of greater investor differentiation and more idiosyncratic price movements in emerging markets creates a window of opportunity for sovereign securitization. x Although event risk and foreign exchange risk can be limited in future low securitization, every future flow securitization is subject to performance risk and sovereign risk if accumulated receivables are not enough to liquidate investor claims or government actions, such as the redirection of exports, inhibit future asset performance. xi CBEAs, which first appeared in the mid-1990s, are cross-border ABS backed by existing assets and sold to foreign investors in foreign currency. xii As opposed to the securitization of existing claims, the securitization of future receivables ("future flow securitization") involves the sale of a future claim against obligors who are yet to be identified. xiii Other structured debt on copa revenue issued by Argentinean subnationals include U.S.$200m of secured medium-term notes issued by the Province of Tucuman and U.S.$120m of copa tax revenue collateralized medium-term notes issued by the Province of Santiago del Estero. xiv The classic sovereign default scenario of nations with unsustainable debt involves unilateral measures in the form of moratoria declared on all foreign obligations or debtors domiciled within the country (both private and public), exchange controls, capital account restrictions, debt reschedulings, suspension of constitutional guarantees on property rights and the temporary reduction in or interruption of revenue transfers from the central government to the subnational sector. xv Besides asset securitization, also other forms of structured finance are available to governments to conduct sound asset-liability management. As part of on on-going plan to shift the public debt stock into local currency, the Mexican government issued bond exchange warrants for foreign currency-denominated government bonds in November 2005. Mexico was the first developing nation to complete such a contingent liability management exercise in order to maintain sound debt liability management despite structural restrictions on overall public finance. These warrants allowed holders to profitably exchange sovereign eurobonds for the country's pesodenominated bonds if rising U.S. interest rates and a more accommodative Mexican monetary policy would lower the yield on dollar-denominated debt in the wake of spread compression. Note that the option of switching foreign currency holdings into local debt implies a profitable yield compression trade, which gains in value as the yield gap between the government's dollar bonds and peso bonds narrows. 
